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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Rolli NL Perkins (Guest Editor)
Question 1: If an accused person confesses while in the custody of officers
but before he has been taken before a committing magistrate, is this
confession admissible in evidence?
Answer:
It might be excluded because of other circumstances not mentioned here,
such as threats or promises; but the facts stated in the question would not
render the confession inadmissible. This is true even in a federal prosecu-
tion, although there seems to have been some misunderstanding on this
point since the decision in the case of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943). There need be no further doubt in this regard
since the more recent case of United States v. Mitchell, 64 S.Ct. 896 (April
24, 1944).
Mitchell was arrested for housebreaking and larceny, and admitted his
guilt almost as soon as he reached the police station. He told the officers
of various articles of stolen property to be found in his home and con-
sented to their going to his house to recover such property, which they
did at once. He was then held in custody for eight days before being taken
to a committing magistrate for arraignment. Upon trial before the United
States District Court, he attempted to have this confession and the prop-
erty found as a result thereof, excluded from evidence. The judge per-
mitted all of this evidence to be introduced, however, and Mitchell was
convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed this conviction on the theory that the admission of the
confession, and of the stolen property secured from his home through his
consent, was barred by the rule of the McNabb case. The Supreme Court
of the United States held that this was a misunderstanding of the McNabb
case, and that Mitchell was properly convicted.
The Supreme Court, reiterating the position it had taken in the McNabb
case, refused to limit the issue to the "constitutional question of ascertain-
ing when a confession comes from a free choice and when it is extorted
by force, however subtly applied." It emphasized, however, significant
differences between the two cases. In the McNabb case one of the de-
fendants was subjected to unremitting questioning by half a dozen police
officers for five or six hours and the other for two days. This was in
flagrant disregard of the legally required procedure and the McNabb case
stands for the rule that inexcusable detention for the purpose of illegally
extracting evidence from an accused, and the successful extraction of such
inculpatory statements by continuous questioning for many hours under
psychological pressure, will render the evidence thus obtained inadmissible
in a federal case without an actual finding that the confession was "in-
voluntary."
In the Mitchell case the confession was made while the accused was in
custody and before he had been taken before a committing magistrate for
arraignment. Moreover, the accused was illegally held in custody eight
days before arraignment. The court emphasizes that this detention was
, illegal. But this illegality had no bearing upon the confession itself.
Mitchell admitted his guilt to the officers within a very few moments after
his arrest. He then told them of the stolen property in his house and
consented to their going for it. The unlawful conduct of the officers in
holding him in custody without taking him promptly before a committing
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magistrate, occurred after his confession had been made and the stolen
property had been recovered.
The facts of the two cases are so widely different that more decisions
will be needed to indicate just where the line is to be drawn. But the
Mitchell case makes the answer to this question perfectly clear. A con-
fession is not inadmissible (even in a federal case) merely because it was
made by an accused person while he was in custody and before he had
been taken before a committing magistrate for arraignment.
Question 2: If a defendant is convicted in a state court, and claims that
a confession was improperly admitted in evidence against him, is it
possible for him to carry this point to the Supreme-Court of the United
States? If so, will the case be in all respects the same as if the prose-
cution had started in a federal court?
Answer:
The answer is yes and no: yes to the first part of the question and
no to the second.
The admission of a coerced confession over the objection of the coerced
defendant is a violation of the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Hence, if this is
the defendant's claim there is a federal question involved which may be
carried to the Supreme Court of the United States. In such a case,
however, the sole authority of the Supreme Court is to ascertain whether
basic safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment have been violated. In
the Mitchell case, referred to in the answer to the previous question,
while holding that the court was not limited to this constitutional issue
in passing on a federal conviction, the distinction was emphasized in these
words: "Therefore, in cases coming from the state courts in matters of
this sort, we are concerned solely with determining whether a confession
is the result of torture, physical or psychological and not the offspring
of reasoned choice... But under the duty of formulating rules of evidence
for federal prosecutions we are not confined to" this constitutional question.
Shortly after the Mitchell case the court had occasion to pass upon a
confession admitted in evidence against the defendant in a state prosecution.
Ashcraft was arrested by Tennessee officers and by them held incom-
municado for 36 hours. During that time relays of officers, experienced
investigators, and lawyers questioned him without respite. From 7 o'clock
Saturday evening until 6 o'clock Monday morning Ashcraft steadily denied
that he had anything to do with the murder of his wife. He was then
said to have confessed that he hired another to kill her. This alleged
confession was admitted in evidence against him and he was convicted in
the state court. This conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court of
the United States, on the ground that this confession was not voluntary
and hence there was a denial of "due process of law" in permitting this
alleged confession to be admitted in evidence against him. Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 64 S.Ct. 921 (May 1 ,1944).
Question 3: A search warrant described the premises by street and number.
When the officer arrived at this street and number he found it was an
apartment house made up of twenty different apartments occupied by
twenty different families. What should the officer do?
Answer:
He should return for a new warrant with a more accurate description.
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It would be as unreasonable to search twenty different apartments under
one roof, when only one was under suspicion, as to search twenty different
houses each having its own roof. A description so general that it merely
indicated the house to be searched as included within a group of twenty
houses would be so obviously inadequate that no experienced officer would
think of attempting to execute it. The description of the premises by
street and number does not disclose any inadequacy on the face of the
warrant.' But as soon as it is discovered that the place so described is
an apartment house, sheltering more than a single family or other unit,
it is apparent that a mistake has been made.
It may be added, although this is not the peace officer's problem, that
unless the magistrate was himself at fault, he will need additional sworn
evidence before he can issue a proper warrant in this case.
Question 4: What is the situation of an officer who has legally seized
certain property but has omitted to take some step required by law after
such seizure?
Answer:
In many jurisdictions his position is practically the same as if the
seizure had been illegal in the first place. The criminal law has frowned
upon the notion of retroactive crime, but the law of torts has not hesi-
tated to make use of the "relation back" device. Thus one who enters
upon the land of another lawfully and while there commits a trespass, is
said to be a "trespasser ab initio." That is, he is treated as if he had
entered without lawful authority--he is a trespasser from the beginning.
In the same way, one who is authorized to deal with another's chattel in
a certain way, and takes it lawfully for this purpose, becomes a trespasser
ab initzo if he makes an unlawful use of the thing after it is in his posses-
sion. A sheriff or other officer, for example, who seizes goods lawfully
under a writ becomes subject to liability as a trespasser if he sells them
otherwise than pursuant to a court order.
One of the leading cases applying this theory to the problem presented
in the question, involved the carcass of a bull moose. A hunter lawfully
killed the moose in the Province of New Brunswick and transported it
to Bangor, Maine. This, however, was during the closed season in Maine
and under the statute in that state the possession of such a carcass was
unlawful during the closed season "whenever or wherever taken, caught
or killed." A Maine game warden seized the carcass of the bull moose
on October 15. Over two months later the hunter sued the game warden
for the value of the carcass. The court held that the seizure was lawful
when made, but that it was based upon an alleged crime and that the
accused had a constitutional right to a speedy trial of that issue. During
the period of nearly two and a half months between the seizure and the
suit, the game warden had held the carcass without securing a warrant for
the arrest of the hunter or taking any other steps to determine his guilt
or innocence of the alleged offense. The game warden was justified at
the time of the original seizure, but that justification ceased long before
the civil suit was brought against him, and by his neglect he had become
a trespasser ab initio. Woods v. Perkins, 119 Me. 257, 110 Atl. 633 (1920).
The same result has been reached in cases under statutes authorizing the
seizure of intoxicating liquor without a warrant under certain circum-
stances but requiring the officer to institute forfeiture proceedings. The
failure of an officer to institute such proceedings within a reasonable time
after the seizure has been held to make him a trespasser ab initio.
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For this reason it is important for the officer to know what the law
requires him to do with property he has seized, and to be sure no required
step is omitted.
Question 5: Is it a crime for a person to steal food if taking that food
is necessary to save himself from starvation?
Answer:
No, it is not a crime for him to take that food if the taking is really
necessary to preserve his life. The law recognizes this excuse only where
it is actually necessary for the taker to help himself to avoid starvation
(or reasonably seems to him to be necessary) and does not extend it to
cases where it is merely more convenient for him to resort to self-help
than to obtain sustenance by other means. Under ordinary circumstances
in the modern community it is not necessary to take another's food without
his consent to avoid starvation because appeal may be made to the public
authorities. But if a man should be lost in the mountains and should come
upon a remote cabin whose owner was away, he might be so exhausted
at the time as to present a case of real necessity. And if so, his taking
of food without an opportunity to secure the consent of the absent owner
would not be a crime. The necessity would excuse the deed. (It may be
added, that although the word "steal" is broader than the word "larceny",
it also involves the element of unlawfulness. Hence this word is not
properly used in the question. If the taking is really necessary to avoid
starvation it is not "stealing.")
Question 6: What is a principal?
Answer:
If one man employs another to represent him in a lawful transaction
the first is a principal and the second is his agent. But if one person em-
ploys another to commit murder and the homicide is perpetrated according
to this plan, the one who carries out the order is the principal while the
"employer", if not present at the time, is an accessory before the fact.
If only one person is guilty of a certain crime he is always a principal.
This is true whether he played a lone hand in the literal sense, or whether
he made use of an innocent agent. If, for example, a doctor should prepare
a poison to kill his patient, and should inform the nurse that it was a bene-
ficial medicine and direct her to administer it to the patient at a certain
time, the doctor would be a principal, and not an accessory before the fact,
if homicide resulted from this plan, whether the doctor was present when
the fatal dose was innocently administered by the nurse or not. And the
lone murderer who destroys his enemy by an infernal machine set to go
off at a certain time, is a "principal", no matter how far he may be from the
fatal scene at the time of the explosion.
Whenever two or more are guilty of the same felony, only those who
were present at the time of its commission are principals, according to the
common law, although one who was actively aiding at the moment of per-
petration may be held to have been constructively present, even if he was
actually some distance away at the time. Thus a confederate who aided
in a stage coach robbery by signaling its approach to the appointed spot by
means of a fire on a distant mountain top, was held to be constructively
present at the time and therefore a principal rather than an accessory.
Similarly, if two should go the house of a third for the purpose of murdering
him, and one should remain at the door, to watch for approachers and be
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ready to give instant aid if needed, while the other should go in and strike
the fatal blow, both would be principals even if the one on guard could
not see or hear the actual killing. On the other hand, if two or more have
planned a felony, and one of them is not actually present at the time, and
not constructively present in the sense that he is giving actual aid to the
scheme at the moment of its commission or is prepared to do so if needed,
such a one is an accessory before the fact and not a principal,-according
to the common law.
After what has been said it is hardly necessary to speak further of the
accessory before the fact. He is one who has commanded or procured the
principal to commit the felony, or has aided and abetted him in its perpetra-
tion, but was not present, either actually or constructively at the time. An
accessory after the fact is one who gives assistance to the offender after the
felony has been committed and with knowledge of the other's guilt. A
typical illustration is the case of a man who conceals a felon in his house
and misleads officers who are seeking him by giving false directions for the
pursuit,--assuming, of course, that he had knowledge of the felony at the
time.
Returning to the subject of principals, it may be pointed out that these
are of two degrees. The principal in the first degree is he who either
commits the prohibited act himself or procures it to be committed by the
hand of an innocent agent. The principal in the second degree is one who
aids and abets the perpetration of the crime and is present, actually or con-
structively at the time.
The distinction between the two kinds of principals seems to have been
one of description only, the procedure and punishment being the same. But
the common law made a very important difference in this respect between
principals and accessories. One result of this difference was found in the
rule that there could be no conviction of an accessory unless the principal
had been convicted previously, or was convicted jointly with the accessory.
In one case, for example, the accessory persuaded the principal to commit
suicide before trial (upon a promise to make ample provision for his family)
and this barred any prosecution against the accessory for this felony.
The difference between principals and accessories was not recognized in
cases of treason or misdemeanor, but was limited to the felony cases. In
most states the rule that an accessory cannot be convicted without the con-
viction of the principal has been removed by statute, and frequently the
distinction between principals and accessories before the fact has been
abolished entirely.
